Quasi-factual propositions?

I was intrigued by this phrase, which appeared in a Face to faith piece by Theo Hobson (accessed 11.11.11) and which I haven’t come across before. I don’t know what it means (it doesn’t appear in either the Oxford or the Shorter Routledge encyclopedias of philosophy), and so is very likely to come in handy for believers, who don’t like their mysteries too much disturbed by the clear light of reason and comprehension.

Hobson is worried that he doesn’t have a proper “sense of vocation” to become a priest:

It feels more or less the opposite of a clear majestic summons from on high – alas (wouldn’t that be nice?).

That final parenthesis is telling, since as far as I’m concerned it would not be nice at all if he mistook a voice in his head for the voice of a magic man in the sky. That little word “calling” begs an awfully big question, that of agency in the universe other than what is visible in life on Earth. There is no evidence of such an agency existing (for example, those who infer a creator of the universe must prove that the big bang was not a random event, for if it were it would not need an explanation), but there is a great deal of evidence concerning how we infer agency in all sorts of ways, with our splendid theory of mind.

Hobson’s preference is to downplay beliefs (despite his taste for theological jargon) and go for ritual instead:

But do I really, fully believe in it all, or enough of it to sound like an exemplary, professional believer? Well, we Anglicans claim the right to be seemingly evasive here. It’s complicated, belief; it’s not black and white, neat and tidy. What matters is not that we assert our belief in quasi-factual propositions, but that we perform it in ritual, in the set prayers and actions of worship. Ritual is central to my attraction to the church.

Fine, if he wants to engage in rituals – the smells and bells bit of religion – but he shouldn’t confuse belief with the justification of belief: a belief ought to be capable of being expressed clearly, in a “black and white” way if you like; what is complicated is determining whether or not it’s true. He anticipates being asked “awkward questions, like whether the virgin birth really happened”: here, the belief couldn’t be simpler – did or did not such and such a virgin give birth in such and such a place at such and such a time? – and the answer (beyond all reasonable doubt) happens to be equally straightforward: in absence of any credible evidence whatsoever, no. What is so difficult about that?

Of course, one reason to downplay beliefs is to avoid having to defend their truth. (There are some – John Gray, for example – who don’t believe in the truth of many religious beliefs but who argue that belief isn’t all it’s cracked up to be, anyway.) But Christianity depends on a few crucial beliefs, which the Christian must believe are true, otherwise they are not a Christian. Hobson can try to dilute religion to ritual, but there will always be a core set of beliefs that must be held, for example, for Anglicans, the Thirty-Nine Article of Religion (accessed 11.11.11). Whatever beliefs Hobson chooses to embrace, he should bear in mind Daniel Kahneman’s good epistemological advice (2011, pp. 153–54):

Your probability that it will rain tomorrow is your subjective degree of belief, but you should not let yourself believe whatever comes to your mind. To be useful, your beliefs should be constrained by the logic of probability.