Friday 25 November 2011

24.11.11 The Bentham Lecture 2011: 300 Years of Hume
(Peter Millican)

Why do philosophers (unlike historians, psychologists, etc.) continue to study Hume? The questions we call philosophical tend to be difficult and “progress by philosophers does not necessarily register as progress in philosophy” to outsiders.

Hume was a pioneer in the science of man, and his method has been useful recently in cognitive science (cf. Jerry Fodor). Philosophy is open to both new and old approaches. In discussions of the so-called hard problem of consciousness, we often hear that subjective experiences cannot have a physical basis, and it is thought that Hobbes’s notorious materialism (there is no soul stuff) can’t be true because matter can’t think. Hume showed that we cannot establish causation a priori just by sitting in an armchair, and therefore the idea that matter cannot give rise to consciousness is refuted. So many philosophers are ignorant of this point.

There is a current fashion for armchair metaphysics, all a priori, which is a very active area. “My own suspicion is that this fashion will fade” but the bandwagon will produce some decent philosophy (perhaps meta-metaphysics?).

The economists’ idea of a perfectly rational agent who always acts to maximize their utility is a fantasy. [cf. Frank]

Hume’s Fork: is this idea a relation of ideas or a matter of fact?

The reason of animals is largely instinctive [cf. System 1 thinking].

Hume’s dangerous message was that we are clever animals, not lower angels.

Darwin read lots of Hume and took him seriously. Compare these two passages, the first from Origin and the second from Dialogues:
When we no longer look at an organic being as a savage looks at a ship, as at something wholly beyond his comprehension; when we regard every production of nature as one which has had a history; when we contemplate every complex structure and instinct as the summing up of many contrivances, each useful to the possessor, nearly in the same way as when we look at any great mechanical invention as the summing up of the labour, the experience, the reason, and even the blunders of numerous workmen; when we thus view each organic being, how far more interesting, I speak from experience, will the study of natural history become!

If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine? And what surprise must we feel, when we find him a stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving? Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made; and a slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world-making.
Hume’s treatment of the problem of evil (10 and 11) is essential for any student. How come there is disagreement and a range of interpretations of Hume’s writings? I believe the proliferation of interpretations is a sign of the immaturity of the field. Serious, careful Hume scholarship is relatively recent, and it is not yet the rule to back up a claim with citations to the text [I find this astonishing!]: when you make a claim, show where it came from.

Of miracles has generated a surprising diversity of reaction, with scholars misunderstanding terms, what is meant by the laws of nature, proof, etc., according to their own prejudice. Hume’s argument is far better than his critics would allow, but Millican still believes it is flawed, and there is room for multiple readings.

Hume was sceptical of faculty language, e.g. of talk of the faculty of reason, of the imagination, etc. H. H. Price is good on Hume (Hume’s Theory of the External World).

Millican believes 10.1 (accessed 29.11.11) is based on a presupposition that fails, since he doesn’t think Hume fully understood the logic of what has since become standard probability theory. We need to adjust to a “probability of testimony” in 10.13:
That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish: And even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior.
So this should be:
That no testimony is sufficient to render a miracle more probable than not, unless the testimony be of such a kind that occurrence of false testimony of that kind would be even less likely than the fact which it endeavours to establish...
Hume is a giant of philosophy, of whom there are so few, compared with the more modern, modish philosophers. Millican noted the serendipity of Einstein reading Hume before he developed special relativity. Einstein acknowledged that positivism suggested his theory, and in a letter he emphasized the contribution of Hume above that of Mach. Hume encourages us to see connections everywhere, and in that sense is one of the least specialist philosophers.

Q&A

Millican gave a robust assessment of Rousseau (employing some arcane jargon) in response to a question about the Frenchman’s meeting with Hume – “Rousseau was an absolute nutter” – in contrast with Hume himself, who, by all accounts, was a thoroughly amiable and decent chap. Hume thought there might be a brotherhood between them, but it all ended in tears. Adam Smith regarded Hume very warmly.

To a question about Hume’s attitude towards induction, Millican referred to his own short paper, Is Hume an Inductive Sceptic? (Part of his answer made me think of System 1 thinking.)

In the Dialogues, Hume puts the following in the mouth of Philo:
...the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence...
This is Philo’s “confession”, which is saying almost nothing.

On his deathbed, the last paragraph Hume ever wrote, his final word, includes:
...whether the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure of human thought, be not energies that probably bear some remote analogy to each other...
This is what Millican meant by “artful writing”. Of course Hume was an atheist.

Millican’s own particular interest is in the social sciences, and spoke enthusiastically about how writing computer programs could be wonderful for philosophy. Against much inertia (“How many Oxford academics does it take to change a light bulb? Change?”), he has a new degree starting next year.

He finished with a suitable blast against religion, which has too much influence in society, corrupts our morals, and stands in the way of a secular society, which would be better for all of us.

Very reliable online versions of Hume’s works are available at http://www.davidhume.org/texts/.

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